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  • The Missing Middle: Can the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange  (ECSE) Serve Growth‑Stage SMEs?

    The Missing Middle: Can the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange  (ECSE) Serve Growth‑Stage SMEs?

    Post 2 of 4 – Reimagining the Capital Ecosystem of the OECS

    Author: Tony Regisford

    Reading time: 8 minutes

    This post is about the missing middle: growth‑stage small enterprises.

    Think of a business with 10 to 49 employees. It has revenue, a track record, a good customer base, experienced staff, and a solid product. The owner is ambitious.

    She needs short-term working capital to fill some larger orders, and she also has expansion plans – new equipment, a bigger space. In all, she needs EC$300,000. That is more than she can put together on her own.

    She is skeptical about trying a commercial bank. Collateral requirements. High interest rate. She suspects that the repayment period will be too short for her business cycle.

    So she does what many other businesses in that position do. She stalls and remains small.

    There is good news. In 2023, the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission (ECSRC) approved the Securities (Crowdfunding) Rules and opened a Regulatory Sandbox. Two platforms are now in testing.

    The question now is, how do we make what the ECSRC has done work for our SMEs.

    What Equity Crowdfunding Can Do

    Equity crowdfunding is a legitimate capital market instrument. It is one of the tools that can help growth-stage companies to move to the next level of growth. It suits businesses with a compelling narrative and a product the public likes. Not every SME in the OECS fits that profile, but enough of them do. For those that do not fit the crowdfunding profile, I will explore blended solutions in the next post.

    How Crowdfunding Differs from a Bank Loan

    An investor can participate with a modest amount, typically far less than that required for private equity or venture capital. That opens the door to regional and diaspora investors. The regulatory requirements are lighter because the Crowdfunding Rules 2023 were designed for MSMEs. A successful crowdfunding round gets a business used to being transparent, accountable, and investor‑ready. This is the same discipline a future ECSE listing would demand.

    Typical Roadblocks

    These are the typical roadblocks I have been advised about when operationalising a crowdfunding platform:

    Investor onboarding is one. Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti‑Money Laundering (AML) complexity, remote verification, and trust all create barriers – especially for diaspora investors.

    MSME readiness is another challenge. Many businesses lack audited financials, strong business plans, or sound governance.

    Legal friction can slow things down too: Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) requirements for project owners, Key Investment Information Sheet (KIIS) documentation rules, and investor caps all add layers of complexity.

    The absence of a secondary market also reduces willingness to invest. Early investors have no way to exit.

    Passporting is another hurdle. Harmonised laws exist, but operational mutual recognition across eight territories takes time.

    Platform capitalisation remains a concern. Under‑funded platforms fail.

    The experts that I have spoken to believe that these are solvable problems, but they require coordinated action between regulators, platform developers, and the private sector.

    The ArawakX Cautionary Tale

    Worthy of mention is the failure of the Bahamas’ first crowdfunding platform. I did a bit of research into the “why” and this is what I found:

    Insolvency and Financial Mismanagement

    The Securities Commission of The Bahamas found that ArawakX was insolvent to the tune of $2.4 million. There was a pattern of commingling client and company monies, suggesting that client funds were used to finance the platform’s operations and pay staff salaries – a fundamental breach of fiduciary duty. The platform also failed to settle debts, including a $28,000 invoice from its portal provider, CrowdEngine, which eventually cut off its services due to non‑payment.

    Regulatory Breaches and Legal Consequences

    The company was accused of governance irregularities, regulatory breaches, and possible criminal infractions. The Chief Justice noted that some breaches warrant criminal penalties and found there was more than sufficient evidence to justify the appointment of a provisional liquidator. The platform and its parent company also carried out an unauthorised public offering of their own shares, which is a criminal offence under the Securities Industry Act, the legislation that governs securities markets in the Bahamas.

    Governance Failures and Misconduct

    The platform’s principals were accused of failing to co‑operate with the liquidators and of setting up a similar, unregulated operation in the United States. Several whistleblowers, including a former Securities Commission executive director, raised concerns about how the company was being run, including excessive spending and a lack of proper controls.

    The Human Cost – Investor Losses

    Nearly 900 Bahamians lost their entire investment in a Red Lobster franchise crowdfunding raise, totalling $90,384. Over 100 investors who directly invested in ArawakX itself are also facing a total loss. The company now insolvent and $2 million in claims remain unpaid.

    Important for Us – OECS

    The ArawakX failure should be taken as a regional lesson.

    A platform must be adequately funded from the start and not rely on future revenue to cover its current costs.

    There must be strict separation of client funds from operational funds, proper financial controls, and transparent operations.

    The Securities Commission of The Bahamas took decisive action, which was ultimately supported by the courts.

    The loss of hundreds of small investors can set back the entire concept of equity crowdfunding for years, eroding public trust. The region has seen this before. CLICO and BAICO left thousands of people with nothing. If crowdfunding fails the same way, it will be another reason for people like me to believe that the system is not for us.

    The above addresses the fundamentals of adequate capitalisation, good governance, regulatory oversight, and investor protection.

    ArawakX squandered an opportunity while potentially damaging the credibility of crowdfunding across the Caribbean.

    The Cost of Delay

    Even without a collapse, delaying an OECS crowdfunding platform carries a cost. I fully accept and understand why the I’s must be dotted and the T’s crossed. Still, we must not let caution become inertia. The longer an OECS crowdfunding platform takes to become operational, the longer these opportunities go abegging.

    EC$1.27 billion in annual diaspora remittances will continue to flow into consumption only.

    SMEs that need EC$50,000 to EC$1 million have nowhere to turn and will continue to stay small or die.

    There will be no opportunity for a successful entrepreneur in Antigua to back a promising start‑up in Grenada through a properly regulated channel.  His capital remains siloed.

    Without a middle tier, the ECSE remains a market for government debt and a handful of banking stocks.

    Let’s make this happen. The longer we wait, the more we lose!

    Things for you to consider/answer as an SME owner or potential investor:

    Would you consider raising equity through a crowdfunding platform and if not, what would hold you back?

    If you wanted to invest in an OECS SME growth-company, would you do so using a crowdfunding platform?

    Do the identified missed opportunities resonate with you?

    Next Post: Beyond Commercial Banking – Blended Solutions for OECS Entrepreneurs.

    In the next post I will explore blended solutions – guarantees, first‑loss provisions, patient capital vehicles – for businesses that are not ready for equity crowdfunding but have outgrown commercial bank lending.

    But for now, I urge the private sector to show up. Let’s get the existing crowdfunding framework operational.

    Leave a comment or contact me directly: tony@tonyregisford.com

    Footnote: This is my personal commentary. The views expressed in this post are mine alone, as Tony Regisford, and do not represent any organisation I work for or am associated with, including the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the OECS Business Council, and the Caribbean Network of Chambers of Commerce (CARICHAM).

  • Reimagining the Capital Ecosystem of the OECS: A Series

    Reimagining the Capital Ecosystem of the OECS: A Series

    Author: Tony Regisford

    Reading time: 10 minutes (Preamble + Diagnosis)

    Disclaimer

    The views expressed in this blog are mine alone and do not represent any organisation I work for or am associated with, including the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the OECS Business Council and the Caribbean Network of Chambers of Commerce (CARICHAM). This is my personal commentary.

    Welcome

    Let me start by letting you know that I am not an economist or a finance expert. I do not write from the position of someone who has formal qualifications that would traditionally permit me to speak as an “authority” on the capital ecosystem of the OECS.

    What I do think I have is proximity and involvement, having spent several years in discussions with relevant actors on the problems and constraints that have stymied the full potential of the contribution the region’s entrepreneurs could make to sustainable economic growth. This proximity gives me useful insight and my attempt at writing may help to generate answers.

    In this series I will share my observations, suggestions and thoughts, and invite you to share your views and tell me where I am wrong, incomplete, naïve, warm or right on the money. Before publishing I will consult people who know more than I do (economists, bankers, entrepreneurs, policymakers). I will attempt to bring their voices into this series.

    This is me thinking out loud and inviting you to think along.

    About this Series

    In my day-to-day work, the issue of “access to finance” has been flagged many times as a constraint to the development of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). It is narrated in strategy documents, recited at conferences and discussed by policy makers who understand the frustration of many start-ups and businesses that have the potential for growth – stalled only by a lack of finance.

    I don’t think that there is a silver bullet application that could be used to overcome the many challenges faced in addressing the access to finance issue. This series is certainly not one, but hopefully it can help light the path that leads to the answers.

    What This Series Will Cover

    Over the next several weeks, I plan to publish four posts. I say plan, because the topics may shift depending on what I learn from the people I consult, and from you.

    Post 1: The Diagnosis

    Why OECS businesses struggle to scale despite regional integration. I will share patterns I have observed, and hope that I hear from business owners: Does this match your experience?

    Post 2: The Missing Middle

    How the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) might be modernized to serve SMEs.

    Post 3: Beyond Commercial Banking – Solutions for OECS Entrepreneurs.

    While commercial banks serve some needs, they do not solve every financing gap. What if we combined public funds, donor concessional capital, and private investment in smarter ways? This post explores guarantees, first-loss provisions, patient capital vehicles, and other blended instruments. I will attempt to share what I am learning from ongoing work in this space.

    Post 4: The African Parallel

    What smaller African capital markets (Botswana, Mauritius, Rwanda) have done that we have not. Are there lessons for us in what they are doing and is anything transferable?

    What I Need from You

    To be engaged. Tell me where I am wrong, correct my technical misunderstandings, let me know if you think I am completely off base. I will also welcome your positive feedback. At all times, let’s keep the conversation constructive

    Okay, Let’s see where this goes.

    The Diagnosis: Why OECS Businesses Struggle to Scale

    (Post 1 of 4 – Reimagining the Capital Ecosystem of the OECS)

    We have a paradox.

    The OECS has a harmonised securities legal framework, a regional stock exchange (ECSE), and a single currency. By any measure, that is advanced infrastructure for a group of small island states.

    Yet a growth-stage company in the OECS cannot reliably raise EC$300,000 in equity from regional investors. A diaspora OECS national sending remittances home has no regulated channel to invest that capital in a local business. And an entrepreneur who thinks beyond a bank loan is often seen as naive.

    This is a manifestation of structural failure – meaning the problem is not a missing policy tweak but a fundamental mismatch between what our capital market was built to do and what our economy now needs.

    1. The ECSE is not a pipeline for growth companies

    The Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange is functionally a market for government debt and a handful of banking stocks. Liquidity is low. New listings are rare. The listing requirements (audited financials, a prospectus, significant working capital) are designed for established large firms. They exclude well over 90% of OECS enterprises. The result is a capital market with no middle tier. You either scrape by on personal savings and small loans, or you are large enough for a formal stock exchange listing. The space in between (where most ambitious businesses live and die) is empty

    What we lack is a layered capital market. In Nigeria, the SEC crowdfunding rules (2021) explicitly created a tier for MSMEs to raise up to equivalent of EC$3-5 million. BISX in the Bahamas, is rebuilding its crowdfunding and SME platform after the ArawakX collapse, learning from failure. The UK’s new Public Offer Platforms Regime (2026) eliminated the prospectus requirement for platforms like Crowdcube, allowing unlimited raises with due diligence but no full prospectus.

    The OECS has none of this. We have the legal foundation – harmonised securities laws across eight territories. But that’s not enough. What we need is a regulatory arrangement where a company or platform licensed in one OECS member state is automatically recognised and permitted to operate in all others. Passporting, in other words. This would turn our harmonised laws from a theoretical achievement into a practical, business-ready reality. An equity crowdfunding platform licensed in St. Lucia could immediately serve entrepreneurs and investors in the rest of the OECS, thus building a single market for capital.

    2. Remittances are trapped in consumption, not investment

    In 2025, OECS nationals abroad sent home an estimated EC$1.27 billion in remittances. For St. Vincent and the Grenadines alone, the 2024 figure was approximately EC$255 million. Remittances range between 5 and 15% of GDP depending on the territory.

    That capital flows into housing, education, healthcare, and daily consumption. All worthy uses. But none of it builds the productive capacity of the economy in a lasting way. None of it gives diaspora nationals equity ownership in the businesses that could create employment and drive economic growth.

    While governments across the region talk about moving beyond remittances to investment, there is no regulated, trusted, low-cost vehicle for diaspora nationals to invest equity in OECS growth companies. The facilitating technology exists, e.g., digital identity verification, secure payment rails, and platform integration are already proven elsewhere. The Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission (ECSRC) could create a Diaspora Investor classification with simplified accreditation and remote Know Your Customer (KYC). Governments could provide tax neutrality on returns. This calls for a coordinated push.

    3. Patient capital does not exist at scale

    A commercial bank lends against collateral, expects monthly repayments, and wants its money back in 12-36 months. While this is a rational model for working capital and equipment, it is unsuited for a business that needs time to do research and development and market building.

    Patient capital is missing – equity or quasi-equity that accepts lower or no returns in early years, takes real risk, and commits to five to ten years. In larger economies, venture capital, angel networks, development finance institutions, and blended finance vehicles fill that gap.

    In the OECS, we have fragments. A few government grant programmes. Some revolving loan funds. The occasional donor project. But no systematic market for patient capital.

    The Caribbean Development Bank’s Cultural and Creative Industries Innovation Fund offers a useful model of what blended finance can achieve. So does the European Investment Fund’s co-investment approach. These precedents show that patient capital vehicles are feasible. What we lack is their adaptation and deployment at the scale the OECS requires.

    4. Information asymmetry – a missing intermediary market

    Too many times, loan officers at commercial banks adjudicate on loan applications related to sectors they do not fully understand. On the other hand, too many entrepreneurs apply for loans without submitting a business plan or basic financial records. There is a gap between what commercial banks require and how organised entrepreneurs are.

    In a healthy ecosystem, intermediaries (industry associations, angel groups, specialised small-business lenders, business development organisations) bridge that gap. The OECS has a few, but we do not have the density of intermediaries that makes capital markets work for smaller firms.

    There is therefore a clear case for regulatory and institutional conditions that allow intermediaries to emerge and survive. Equity crowdfunding platforms, co-investment funds, and investor readiness programmes are examples of such intermediaries. Without them, good proposals get rejected because they are poorly packaged. Bad proposals sometimes get funded because they are beautifully packaged. Neither outcome is efficient.

    5. My own intelligence gaps.

    I could be overstating the scale. Perhaps the number of OECS businesses that hit the EC$200,000-EC$500,000 financing wall is smaller than I think. Or perhaps the wall is rational – a market signal that they should not grow.

    I could also be underestimating what already exists. There may be patient capital vehicles or intermediary models in the OECS that I have missed. There may be diaspora investment channels that I am not aware of.

    6. Questions you could help to answer.

    Is my description of the collateral trap and the mismatch in loan payback periods fair?

    What would make commercial banks more comfortable with equity-like instruments or patient capital?

    Which of the structural gaps identified do you think is the most binding?  

    If a regulated platform existed tomorrow, would diaspora nationals invest in a vetted OECS growth company?

    Your answers would be useful. Send them to tony@tonyregisford.com or comment. They would help me to know if my diagnosis is sound or has too many holes.

    Next post: The Missing Middle – Can the ECSE be modernised to serve SMEs without breaking what already works?